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Abstract—The development of renewable energy generation
empowers microgrids to generate electricity to supply itself
and to trade the surplus on energy markets. To minimize the
overall cost, a microgrid must determine how to schedule its
energy resources and electrical loads and how to trade with
others. The control decisions are influenced by various factors,
such as energy storage, renewable energy yield, electrical load,
and competition from other microgrids. Making the optimal
control decision is challenging, due to the complexity of the
interconnected microgrids, the uncertainty of renewable energy
generation and consumption, and the interplay among micro-
grids. The previous works mainly adopted the modeling-based
approaches for deriving the control decision, yet they relied
on the precise information of future system dynamics, which
can be hard to obtain in a complex environment. This work
provides a new perspective of obtaining the optimal control
policy for distributed energy trading and scheduling by directly
interacting with the environment, and proposes a multiagent deep
reinforcement learning approach for learning the optimal control
policy. Each microgrid is modeled as an agent, and different
agents learn collaboratively for maximizing their rewards. The
agent of each microgrid can make the local scheduling decision
without knowing others’ information, which can well maintain
the autonomy of each microgrid. We evaluate the performances of
our proposed method using real-world datasets. The experimental
results show that our method can significantly reduce the cost of
the microgrids compared with the baseline methods.
Index Terms—Energy trading, microgrid, distributed energy
scheduling, multiagent, reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed energy generation enables the microgrids to
generate electricity from renewable sources, such as solar
radiation, winds, etc. This can alleviate the environmental
pollution caused by fossil fuel-based generation and reduce
the energy loss caused by long-distance transmission [1]. The
microgrids can save the cost by utilizing renewable energy
and obtain revenue by selling the surplus in energy markets.
Therefore, it has been witnessed that more and more renewable
energy generators are deployed in the microgrids.
This paradigm has significantly changed the ways of the
trading and scheduling of energy markets [2]. Each microgrid
has become an autonomous entity, which can determine the
trading price and quantity with other microgrids based on its
energy demands and yields. On the other hand, it also requires
each microgrid to make appropriate control decisions on how
to schedule its electrical load and energy storage. For example,
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a microgrid may choose to charge the battery when the market
price is low, and discharge the battery for utilization when the
energy market price is high. Therefore, the microgrids must
have some control mechanism for making optimal trading and
scheduling decision to maximize their interests.
Making the trading and scheduling decisions for a microgrid
is challenging from the following aspects. First, the trading
decision of a microgrid is not only affected by itself but also by
other microgrids. In a bidding market, if a microgrid’s selling
price is too high or buying price is too low, no deal can be
made, which will, therefore, affect the cost and the revenue
of the microgrid. Second, the trading and the scheduling
decisions of a microgrid are coupled. Making the decisions
for trading and scheduling should consider every aspect of the
whole system, including the electrical loads, energy storage
and yield, and market price. Third, the intermittency of re-
newable energy sources (e.g., solar irradiation and wind speed)
increases the uncertainties of energy generation, which makes
the control problem more complex.
Some existing works separately studied the energy trad-
ing and scheduling problem for microgrids. Several previous
works (e.g., [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]) adopted different approaches
to design the trading strategies. However, they did not take
into account the scheduling of the local energy storage and
the electrical load in each microgrid. Some other works
(e.g., [8], [9], [10]) considered the energy storage and load
scheduling problems for microgrids. Yet, they considered the
problem either from the perspective of an individual microgrid
or from the perspective of a centralized controller, which
assumes that all microgrids work as an entire entity without
autonomy. Meanwhile, these works did not consider energy
trading among the microgrids. These two lines of works either
only considered the energy scheduling problem for microgrids,
or only considered the trading problems for microgrids. Thus,
they lack a comprehensive and all-sided analysis for the
trading and scheduling problem for microgrids.
The works in [11], [12], [13], [14] jointly considered the
energy trading and scheduling problem among microgrids
for maximizing the interest of each microgrid. These works
mainly adopted the game-theoretic models for modeling the
trading and scheduling for microgrids [15]. The models rely on
the precise information of future energy yields and electrical
loads as inputs for deriving the optimal scheduling solution.
However, different microgrid environments may be full of
various uncertainties regarding renewable energy generation
and energy consumption, which affects the performances of
the scheduling. For instance, a microgrid may plan to sell a
certain quantity of renewable energy, however, the contract
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may not be fulfilled because of bad weather conditions. The
complexity of the microgrid system, the uncertainty of the
environments, and the interplay among different microgrids
posit many challenges on precisely modeling the problem and
deriving the optimal control decision.
The multiagent deep reinforcement learning approach pro-
vides a new perspective for learning the optimal control
policy by directly interacting with the environment. In this
paper, we propose a multiagent deep reinforcement learning
approach [16] for distributed energy trading and scheduling
for microgrids. Each microgrid is modeled as an agent, and
different agents may collaborate or compete with each other
for maximizing its reward. We adopt the Multi-Agent Deep
Deterministic Policy Gradient (MADDPG) approach [17] to
design the algorithm for learning the optimal control policy for
each microgrid. After training, the agent of each microgrid can
independently make the control decision without requiring the
information from other microgrids. The experimental results
from extensive performance evaluations show that our method
can significantly reduce the cost of each microgrid.
The main contributions are summarized as follows.
• Propose a multiagent deep reinforcement learning ap-
proach for modeling the distributed energy trading and
scheduling problem for microgrids and learning the op-
timal control policy for each microgrid.
• Design a bidding-based incentive mechanism for energy
trading among microgrids. The mechanism is suitable for
multiagent reinforcement learning based energy trading.
• Design the network models for the actor and the critic
based on the characteristics of the control actions and
the role of energy trading of each microgrid.
• Implement an energy trading and scheduling simulation
environment and evaluate the performances of the pro-
posed method using real-world datasets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the related works, Section III presents the overview
of the energy trading and scheduling system, Section IV gives
the system models and problem formulation, Section V designs
the neural networks and the learning algorithm, Section VI
evaluates performances, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the existing works on energy
trading and scheduling among microgrids.
One line of research adopted different methods to model
the energy trading for microgrids. Gregoratti et al. [3] and
Matamoros et al. [4] considered the problem of energy trading
among islanded microgrids and adopted the distributed convex
optimization framework for minimizing cost. Wang et al.
[5] and Lee et al. [6] modeled the energy trading among
microgrids using a game-theoretic model and formulated the
energy trading as a non-cooperative game. Wang et al. [7]
proposed an energy trading framework based on the repeated
game for maximizing the revenue of each microgrid and
adopted reinforcement learning to learn the policy. These
works did not consider the local electrical loads in a microgrid
when studying the energy trading problem, yet the scheduling
of local electrical loads also affects the trading decision.
Fig. 1. The reference system of interconnected microgrids. Several microgrids
are interconnected with each other for energy trading and scheduling.
Another line of research studied the energy scheduling
problem for microgrids. Huang et al. [9] developed a control
framework for microgrid energy management by categorizing
energy usage. Fathi et al. [8] proposed an adaptive energy
consumption scheduling method for microgrids under demand
uncertainty to achieve low power generation cost and low
peak-to-average ration. Wang et al. [18] proposed a framework
for planning the renewable energy generation in microgrids.
Fathi et al. [10] considered the power dispatching in mi-
crogrids for minimizing the overall power generation and
transmission cost. Weng et al. [19] studied the distributed
cooperative control for frequency and voltage stability and
power sharing in microgrids. Ahn et al. [20] proposed the
distributed coordination laws for energy generation and distri-
bution in energy network. These works only considered the
energy scheduling problem, and they did not consider the
influence of energy trading among microgrids.
The works in [11], [12], [13], [14] jointly considered the
energy trading and scheduling for microgrids. Wang et al. [11],
[21] proposed a Nash bargaining-based energy trading method.
The proposed method considers each microgrid as an au-
tonomous entity, which aims to minimize its cost through en-
ergy bargaining. Paudel et al. [12] proposed a game-theoretic
model for P2P energy trading among the prosumers in a
community. Kim et al. [13] considered direct energy trading
among microgrids under the network’s operational constraints.
Li et al. [14] proposed a bilateral energy trading framework to
increase the economics benefits of each individual. Different
from these works, we propose a multiagent deep reinforcement
learning approach which can directly learn the optimal control
policy for each microgrid by interacting with the environment.
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we introduce the system overview for
distributed energy trading and scheduling among microgrids.
A. Reference System
We illustrate the reference system of interconnected mi-
crogrids for energy trading and scheduling in Fig. 1. Several
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Fig. 2. The trading flow of the microgrids. Each microgrid submits the bidding
price and quantity to the bidding system, and the clearing price and trading
quantity will be determined based on the double-auction algorithm.
microgrids are interconnected with each other through power
delivery system. Each microgrid consists of the following
components: electrical loads, batteries, and renewable energy
generators. The electrical loads are equipments which consume
electricity, the batteries are utilized to store surplus electricity.
The renewable energy generator can generate electricity from
renewable energy sources, such as solar energy or wind energy.
A microgrid can purchase electricity from the main grid on the
wholesale market or from other microgrids on the hour-ahead
energy market. It can also its sell its surplus energy to other
microgrids on the hour-ahead energy market.
B. Energy Trading Flow
We consider two types of energy markets, namely, the
wholesale market and the hour-ahead bidding market. We
illustrate the trading flows for the microgrids on the hour-
ahead market in Fig. 2. At the beginning of each time slot,
a microgrid needs to determine how to schedule the local
electrical loads, energy storage, and the bidding price and
quantity on the hour-ahead market. The electricity from the
power station is sold on the wholesale market and the price
is known in advanced. A microgrid can trade with other
microgrids on the hour-ahead bidding market. Each microgrid
determines its bidding (buying or selling) price and quantity.
The bidding price and quantity of each microgrid will be
submitted to the bidding system without disclosing to others.
When the bidding period elapses, the bidding system will cal-
culate the final market clearing price and the trading quantity
of each microgrid based on the adopted double-auction trading
algorithm. The payment for each period will be made based
on the real electricity usage of each microgrid.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce the system models and problem
formulation. The main notations are summarized in Table I.
A. Microgrid Components
We consider N interconnected microgrids. The i-th mi-
crogrid is denoted as Mi, where i = 1, 2, ..., N . We adopt
TABLE I
MAIN NOTATIONS
N the number of microgrids
Mi the i-th microgrid, i = 1, 2, ..., N
t discrete time slot, t = 0, 1, 2, ...
gi(t) generation power of microgrid i during time slot t
ri(t) solar radiation in microgrid i during time slot t
ψi the overall area of the solar panels in microgrid i
ei conversion efficiency of the solar panels in microgrid i
Bi maximum battery storage capacity of microgrid i
bi(t) battery level of microgrid i at beginning of time slot t
li(t) electrical load of microgrid i during time slot t
βci , β
d
i battery charging/discharging efficiency of microgrid i
ci(t) battery charging amount of Mi during time slot t
di(t) battery discharging amount of Mi during time slot t
Λi(t) a buyer’s bid price at time slot t
Γi(t) a seller’s sell price at time slot t
p∗(t) the market clearing price at time slot t
χi(t) the bid quantity of microgrid i at time slot t
ρi(t) the payment of Mi to the hour-ahead market
σi(t) revenue for microgrid i during time slot t
vi(t) the supplied energy from microgrid i during time slot t
qi(t) penalty charged to microgrid i at time slot t
ui(t) selling quantity of microgrid i during time slot t
f the weight of penalty for energy under-supply to the grid
$i(t) consumed energy from wholesale market by microgrid i
ξi(t) energy cost of microgrid i for wholesale market
pw the electricity price of the wholesale market
si(t) the state of microgrid i at time slot t
ai(t) the control action of microgrid i for time slot t
ri(t) the reward for microgrid i during time slot t
φi(t) submitted selling quantity of microgrid i at time slot t
λi(t) submitted buying quantity of microgrid i at time slot t
pi∗i the optimal control policy of agent i
γi the discount factor for the reward of agent i
µi(·) the actor network of agent i
Qi(·) the critic network of agent i
N the exploration noise for training
yji the target Q-value of transition j for agent i
a discrete time system in which the time is denoted as
t = 0, 1, 2, .... The duration of a time slot is one hour. Each
microgrid consists of the following components.
a) Renewable Energy Generation: Renewable energy
can be generated in each microgrid from natural energy
sources. In this work, we consider the renewable energy gener-
ation with Solar Photovoltaics (PV). For simplicity, we assume
that the power of the generated electricity in a microgrid is
mainly determined by the solar irradiation, the overall area and
the conversion efficiency of the solar panels in a microgrid,
which follows the following equation,
gi(t) = ψieiri(t), (1)
where gi(t) is the average power of electricity generation
in microgrid i during time slot t, ri(t) is the average solar
radiation in microgrid i during time slot t, ψi is the overall
area of the solar panels in microgrid i, and ei is the conversion
efficiency of the solar panels in microgrid i.
b) Battery: We denote the maximum battery capacity of
microgrid i as Bi. The battery level of microgrid i at the
beginning of time slot t is denoted as bi(t). The battery level
changes due to charging and discharging.
c) Electrical Load: We consider the non-dispatchable
electrical loads in the microgrids. The demand of the electrical
loads in microgrid i during time slot t is denoted as li(t).
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Fig. 3. The double auction mechanism. The buyers (bi) will be sorted in
decreasing order and the sellers (si) will be sorted in increasing order. The
intersection point determines the clearing price and trading amount.
B. Battery Charging and Discharging
During a time slot, a microgrid may charge or discharge the
battery for energy storage or utilization. The changes of the
battery level of the batteries in a microgrid due to the charging
and discharging operations can be modeled as
bi(t) = bi(t− 1) + ci(t)βci −
di(t)
βdi
, 0 < βci , β
d
i < 1, (2)
where βci and β
d
i are the charging and discharging efficiency,
ci(t) is the amount of energy charged to the batteries in
microgrid i during time slot t, and di(t) is the amount of
energy discharged from the batteries in microgrid i during
time slot t. We assume that either charging or discharging can
be performed to the batteries of a microgrid during a time slot.
C. Energy Trading among Microgrids
At the beginning of a time slot, each microgrid determines
whether it should participate in the energy trading of the next
time slot on the hour-ahead market to sell or to buy electricity.
Each microgrid determines the trading price and the trading
quantity that will be submitted to the bidding system. The final
market clearing price and trading quantity will be determined
based on the double auction mechanism.
a) Double Auction Mechanism: We design a double
auction mechanism suitable for multiagent reinforcement
learning-based trading according to the method proposed in
[5]. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the buyers’ bid price at time slot t
will be sorted in decreasing order, denoted as Λ1(t) > Λ2(t) >
Λ3(t) > .... The sellers’ ask prices at time slot t will be sorted
in increasing order, denoted as Γ1(t) < Γ2(t) < Γ3(t) < ....
The aggregate supply curve and demand curve will intersect
at a point where satisfies the following inequality,
Λk(t) > Γl(t) > Λk+1(t), (3)
The market clearing price can be any value within
(Γl(t),Λk(t)). In this work, we adopt p∗(t) = (Λk(t) +
Γl(t))/2 as the market clearing price at time slot t. If the
total demands of the k buyers and the total supply of the l
sellers are mismatching, the buyers with a higher bid price or
the sellers with a lower ask price will be satisfied first. If the
market needs to guarantee the truthfulness of double auction,
it can be modified by excluding seller k and buyer l [5].
b) Monetary Cost for Buying Energy on the Hour-ahead
Market: If a microgrid successfully bid a certain quantity of
energy on the hour-ahead market, it needs to make the payment
to the market. The monetary cost is determined by the market
clearing price and trading quantity, which are determined by
double auction. Suppose microgrid i bids successfully, the
monetary cost for microgrid i during time slot t is
ρi(t) = p
∗(t)χi(t), (4)
where χi(t) is the bid quantity of microgrid i from the hour-
ahead market at time slot t and p∗(t) is the clearing price.
c) Revenue for Selling Energy on the Hour-ahead Mar-
ket: If a microgrid successfully sell energy on the hour-ahead
market, it can get a revenue, which is determined by the market
clearing price and the trading quantity by double auction. Note
that the final energy supply from a microgrid to the energy
delivery system may be less than the pre-determined trading
quantity due to device outrage, bad weather condition or yield
prediction error. Thus, the revenue will be calculated based
on the real energy supply from a microgrid. The revenue for
microgrid i on the hour-ahead market during time slot t is
σi(t) = p
∗(t)vi(t), (5)
where vi(t) is the supplied energy from microgrid i during
time slot t. Note that vi(t) should be no more than the trading
quantity determined by double auction for microgrid i.
d) Penalty for Unfulfilling the Contract: After the trading
is completed, each microgrid needs to fulfill the contract. For
the sellers, they must supply the gird with the amount of
energy that is equal to the pre-determined trading quantity
by double auction. If a seller’s energy supply to the grid is
less than the pre-determined trading amount for any reasons,
the seller will be charged some penalty fees for violating the
contract. The penalty for microgrid i is calculated as
qi(t) = f(ui(t)− vi(t)), ui(t) ≥ vi(t), (6)
where qi(t) is the penalty charged to microgrid i at the end
of time slot t, ui(t) is the pre-determined selling quantity of
microgrid i by double auction at the beginning of time slot
t, vi(t) is the real energy supply of microgrid i to the grid
during time slot t, and f is the weight of penalty.
In this paper, we assume f is the gap between the wholesale
market price and the market clearing price at time slot t. The
practical meaning is that some buyers will utilize ui(t) units
of energy during time slot t at the market clearing price p∗(t)
by trading; if microgrid i only supply vi(t) units, the balance
will be made up by the wholesale market, and microgrid i
will be penalized based on the difference between the market
clearing price and the wholesale market price at time slot t.
e) Monetary Cost for Buying Energy from the Wholesale
Market: If a microgrid consumes more energy from the grid
than its buy quantity from the hour-ahead bidding market, the
exceeding part of the energy consumption will be charged
based on the price of the wholesale market. The overall supply
of energy to a microgrid and its overall consumption of energy
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should be balanced during a time slot. Based on this balance,
we can calculate the consumed energy from the wholesale
energy market by microgrid i during time slot t as
$i(t) = ci(t) + vi(t) + li(t)− gi(t)− di(t)− χi(t). (7)
Note that only one type of operation can be conducted for
a microgrid during a time slot for charging and discharging,
selling and buying, at least one of the two variables should
be zero. The monetary cost for the consumed energy from the
wholesale market by microgrid i during time slot t is
ξi(t) = pw$i(t), (8)
where pw is the electricity price of the wholesale market.
D. Problem Formulation
We formulate the energy trading and scheduling among
microgrids as a Markov Game with continuous action spaces.
Each microgrid is an agent, which aim is to learn the optimal
policy to maximize its overall rewards.
a) State: The state of each microgrid for each time slot
consists of two parts, namely, the local state and the public
state. The local state includes the current battery level, the
historical energy generation power and the historical electrical
load of a microgrid. The public state includes the price of the
wholesale market and the historical market clearing price in
the hour-ahead market. Because the energy generation power
and the electrical load for time slot t are unknown, we adopt
the information of last time slot t− 1 to represent the states.
We denote the state of microgrid i at time slot t as
si(t) = (bi(t), gi(t− 1), li(t− 1), pw, p∗(t− 1)), (9)
where bi(t) is the battery level at the beginning of time slot
t, gi(t − 1) is the renewable energy generation power during
time slot t − 1, li(t − 1) is the load during time slot t − 1,
pw is the wholesale market price, and p∗(t− 1) is the market
clearing price of the hour-ahead market at time slot t− 1.
b) Action: The control action for each microgrid during
each time slot t includes the selling/buying price, the sell-
ing/buying quantity, and the charging/discharging quantity. We
denote the control action for microgrid i at time slot t as
ai(t) = (Λi(t)|Γi(t), φi(t)|λi(t), ci(t)|di(t)), (10)
where operator | represents choosing one action out of the
two, Λi(t)/Γi(t) are the submitted price of microgrid i for
selling/buying energy at time slot t on the hour-ahead market,
φi(t)/λi(t) are the submitted selling/buying quantity of micro-
grid i at time slot t, ci(t)/di(t) are the charging/discharging
quantity of microgrid i during time slot t. Note that a mi-
crogrid can be either a seller or a buyer during a time slot,
and it can either charge battery or discharge battery. In the
implementation, we can use the different ranges of an output
of a neural network to represent different operations. For
instance, the positive numbers of an output represent charging
and the negative numbers represent discharging. Similarly, the
positive numbers of an output represent selling quantity and
the negative numbers represent buying quantity.
c) Reward: The reward for a microgrid during a time
slot is the summation of the revenue and cost, which consist
of four parts: 1) the revenue for selling energy on the hour-
ahead market σi(t), 2) the cost for buying energy from the
wholesale market ξi(t), 3) the cost for buying energy from
the hour-ahead market ρi(t), 4) the penalty for energy under-
supply to the grid qi(t). We define the reward function of
microgrid i for time slot t as follow,
ri(t) = σi(t)− ξi(t)− ρi(t)− qi(t). (11)
The reward reflects the quality of the control policy and each
microgrid aims to maximize its reward.
d) Optimization Objective: The problem of energy trad-
ing and scheduling among microgrids can be formulated
as a Markov Game [22] with N agents and continuous
action spaces. We denote a Markov Game as a tuple, <
S, N,Ai, T ,Ri >, where S is the set of states describ-
ing the environments of all agents, N is the number of
agents, Ai is the set of actions of agent i, T is the state
transition function of the environment, Ri is the set of
rewards of agent i. At each time slot t, the agents observe
their local states s1(t), s2(t), ..., sN (t) and take control ac-
tions a1(t), a2(t), ..., aN (t) according their control policies
pi1, pi2, ..., piN . At the end of time slot t, the agents will receive
their rewards r1(t), r2(t), ..., rN (t). The reward for an agent
is determined by the state of the whole environment and the
actions of all agents. The states of the agents will evolve to
new states s1(t+ 1), s2(t+ 1), ..., sN (t+ 1) according to the
state transition probability function. Our aim is to derive the
optimal control policy for each agent to maximize its overall
discounted future rewards, which can be presented as
pi∗i = arg max
pi
Epi
∞∑
k=0
γki ri(t+ k), (12)
where pi∗i is the optimal control policy for microgrid i, γi is
the discount factor for the reward of agent i, and ri(t+ k) is
the reward for agent i at time slot t + k. The state transition
probability function T is hard to obtain for a complex envi-
ronment, we will introduce the multiagent deep reinforcement
learning approach to learn the optimal policy for each agent
by directly interacting with the environment.
V. LEARNING ALGORITHM FOR DISTRIBUTED ENERGY
TRADING AND SCHEDULING
In this section, we introduce the algorithm for learning the
optimal control policy for each microgrid.
A. Choice of Algorithm
We first briefly introduce why we choose MADDPG for
learning the optimal control policy for distributed energy
trading and scheduling among microgrids.
a) Mixed Cooperative-Competitive: Each autonomous
microgrid can be seen an agent, which makes the decision
for maximizing its rewards. The relationships among the
interconnected microgrids are mixed cooperative-competitive.
One microgrid may compete with other microgrids for energy
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Fig. 4. The network architecture of MADDPG. The actor of an agent inputs
the local state of a microgrid and outputs control action. The critic of an agent
inputs the states and actions of all agents and outputs an evaluation.
selling on the hour-ahead market to maximize revenue; On the
other hand, it could also buy energy from other microgrids at
a lower price compared with the wholesale market to reduce
cost. MADDPG can learn the optimal policy for each agent
in a mixed cooperative-competitive environment.
b) Decentralized Control: MADDPG adopts the frame-
work of centralized training and decentralized execution.
During the training, some extra information of other agents
(e.g., action, rewards, and training episodes) will be used for
training the policy of an agent for learning collaboratively.
However, the private information of other microgrids will not
be used during execution, and only the local information of
a microgrid and the public information are used for local
decision making. Thus, MADDPG is suitable for decentralized
control to maintain the autonomy of each microgrid.
c) Continuous Control: Most control actions in a micro-
grid are continuous, e.g., charging/discharging quantity, trad-
ing price and trading quantity, etc. MADDPG is a multiagent
extension of Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG),
which is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm for solving
continuous control problem. Therefore, MADDPG is naturally
suitable for addressing the continuous control problem.
B. Design of Actor and Critic Networks
We illustrate the network architecture of MADDPG in Fig.
4. Each agent consists of an actor and a critic. The actor
maps the state to the control action. The critic evaluates the
advantage of the actions under the given states compared to
the average actions. We denote the actor network of agent i
as µi(ai|si), where si is the state of microgrid i and ai is
the corresponding control action for microgrid i. The actor
network of an agent inputs the local state and outputs a
control action. We denote the critic network of agent i as
Qi(s1, a1, ..., si, ai, ..., sN , aN ). The critic network inputs the
states (s1, s2, ..., sN ) and the actions (a1, a2, ..., aN ) of all
agents and outputs a real-valued evaluation.
Each agent has an individual critic network, which allows
the agents to have different reward structures, and a microgrid
can learn its optimal policy based on its objectives in a
cooperative, competitive, or mixed environment. We only use
the critic networks for training the actor network of each agent.
Fig. 5. The implementation of the actor network and the critic network of
each agent. If output value of the trading quantity is larger than zero, the
agent will be a buyer. If less than zero, the agent will be a seller.
After training, the critic networks are no longer required, and
we only use the actor network of an agent for making control
action for the corresponding microgrid. Thus, it will not relay
on the states and actions of other microgrids.
We illustrate the implementation of the actor network and
the critic network in Fig. 5. The outputs of an actor network
include the selling price, the bid price, the trading quantity, and
the charging quantity. Because an agent can only be either a
seller or a buyer within one time slot, we use the value of the
output of trading quantity to determine its role. Specifically,
if the output value of trading quantity is larger than zero, the
agent will be a buyer, and the bid price and the trading quantity
will be submitted to the hour-ahead market for biding. If the
output value of the trading quantity is less than zero, the agent
will be a seller, and the selling price and trading quantity will
be submitted for bidding on the hour-ahead market.
In the critic network of an agent, the states of all agents
will be input into a Fully-Connected (FC) layer. The output
vector of the FC layer will be concentrated with the control
actions of all actors, and then input the second FC layer. Note
that the main grid price and the last clearing price are public
information, which are same for each agent. Therefore, they
will be input into the critic network of an agent only once
to avoid duplication and reduce the input dimension of the
critic networks. The activation function of the actor network
is Tanh function, and the range of each output is from −1 to
1, and we will convert them to the actual range of each control
action. The activation function of the critic network is a linear
function and the output is a real value.
C. Learning Algorithm
We now describe how to train the actor network and the
critic network of each agent. The learning process can be
conducted in a simulation environment. The details of the
training algorithm are illustrated in Algorithm 1.
At the beginning of each time slot t, each agent i first
observes the state si of microgrid i. State si will be input into
the actor network µi of agent i and output a control action. For
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the exploration of the state space, we will add an exploration
noise to the control action, and the final control action is
ai = µi(si) +N , (13)
where N is the exploration noise. We adopt an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process [23] to generate the exploration noise.
After obtaining the control action for each agent i, the
control actions will be applied in the corresponding micro-
grids. The simulation environment will simulate the energy
scheduling process and the energy trading process according
to the specified control action for each microgrid. At the
end of a time slot, each agent i can calculate its reward ri
during the time slot by Eq. (11) and observe new state s′i. The
state, action, reward, and new state information of each agent
during a time slot will be stored as a transition in the replay
buffer as (s,a, r, s′), where s = (s1, ..., sN ), a = (a1, ..., aN ),
r = (r1, ..., rN ), and s′ = (s′1, ..., s
′
N ).
At the end of each time slot, the actor network and the
critic network of each agent will be trained with the transitions
sampled from the replay buffer. To stabilize training, a copy of
the actor networks and the critic networks will be created as
target networks for slowly tracking the learned networks. We
denote the target actor network and the target critic network of
agent i as µ′i and Q
′
i, respectively. To train the actor network
and the critic network of an agent, we randomly select S
transitions from the replay buffer. For transition j, we denote
it as (sj ,aj , rj , s′j). The target Q-value of this transition for
agent i will be calculated as follow,
yji = r
j
i + γQ
′
i(s
′j , a′1, ..., a
′
N )|a′k=µ′k(s′k),k=1,...,N, (14)
where γ is the discounting factor and s′k is the k-th item in
s′j (i.e., the next state of agent k). The critic network of agent
i will be updated by minimizing the following loss,
L(θi) =
1
S
S∑
j=1
(yji −Qi(sj ,aj))2, (15)
where θi denotes the network parameters of agent i. The actor
network of agent i will be updated using the policy gradient
(see details in [17]). The target network parameters of each
agent i will be updated using the following equation.
θ′i ← τθi + (1− τ)θ′i, (16)
where θ′i represents the network parameters of the target
network of agent i and τ is the learning rate.
We denote the actor network of agent i after training is µ∗i .
The control action ai for microgrid i can be directly obtained
by observing the state si of microgrid i and inputing si into the
actor network, mathematically denoted as ai = µ∗i (si). Thus,
the computational complexity for obtaining a control action
is only determined by the complexity of the actor network,
which include the number of hidden layers and the number of
neurons in each hidden layer. In this work, the actor network
of an agent consists of two hidden layers. We suppose that
each hidden layer of the actor has n neurons, the complexity
for making a control action for an agent is O(n2).
Algorithm 1 Training Algorithm for MADDPG
1: for episode = 1, 2, ..., M do
2: Observe the microgrids’ states, s = (s1, ..., sN )
3: for step t = 1, 2, ..., T do
4: Make control action for each agent i by Eq. (13).
5: Apply a = (a1, ..., aN ) in the corresponding micro-
grids for energy trading and scheduling
6: Calculate reward r = (r1, ..., rN ) by Eq. (11)
7: Observe the microgrids’ new state s′ = (s′1, ..., s
′
N )
8: Store transition (s,a, r, s′) into the replay buffer
9: Set s← s′
10: for agent i = 1, 2, ..., N do
11: Sample S transitions from the replay buffer
12: Calculate yji for each transition by Eq. (14)
13: Update critic of agent i by minimizing Eq. (15)
14: Update actor of agent i using the policy gradient.
15: Update target network of agent i by Eq. (16)
16: end for
17: end for
18: end for
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we introduce the experiment settings and
evaluate the performances of our proposed method.
A. Experiment Setting and Datasets
We simulate the energy trading and scheduling among four
microgrids with different load characteristics and renewable
energy generation capacities. The electrical load and the
renewable energy generation of each microgrid during each
time slot are scaled from real-world datasets. We illustrate
parts (500 hours) of the load profiles and the renewable energy
generation profiles of each microgrid in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7,
respectively. Microgrid 1 and 2 have more renewable energy
generations and surplus energy to sell. Microgrid 3 and 4 have
heavier loads and less renewable energy generations.
The electricity price on the wholesale market is 22.79
cents/kWh in Singapore. The minimum bidding price on the
hour-ahead market is 15.0 cents/kWh, and the maximum
bidding price is 22.79 cents/kWh, which is equal to the
wholesale market. We use the solar radiation data of one year
at four locations of Singapore, which are obtained from Solcast
[24], to simulate the solar radiation in each microgrid. We
use the scaled historical electricity system demand data for
every half-hour period in Singapore to simulate the electrical
loads of the microgrids [25]. The maximum battery capacities
of Microgrid 1-4 are 100MWh, 100MWh, 20MWh, 10MWh,
respectively. The maximum bid quantity for each microgrid
on the hour-ahead market is 7.5MWh.
The initial exploration noise scale is 1.0, and the explo-
ration noise linearly decreases over 1000 training episodes
till zero. The models are trained over 1500 episodes, and the
performances are evaluated over 1000 episodes. Each episode
consists of 7 ∗ 24 time steps, and each time step in the
simulation is one hour. The batch size is 1024. The learning
rate is 0.01. The discount factor of the reward is 0.8. Each
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(a) Microgrid 1 (b) Microgrid 2 (c) Microgrid 3 (d) Microgrid 4
Fig. 6. The load profile of the four microgrids. The microgrids have different electrical load characteristics, and the electrical loads are time-varying.
(a) Microgrid 1 (b) Microgrid 2 (c) Microgrid 3 (d) Microgrid 4
Fig. 7. The renewable energy generation of each microgrid. Microgrid 1 and 2 have more renewable energy generations and Microgrid 3 and 4 have less.
(a) Microgrid 1 (b) Microgrid 2 (c) Microgrid 3 (d) Microgrid 4
Fig. 8. The convergences of the rewards of different agents. The rewards of the agents will converge after training.
critic network has three hidden layers, the first layer has 1024
neurons, the second layer has 512 neurons, and the third layer
has 256 neurons. Each actor network has two hidden layers,
the first layer has 512 neurons, and the second layer has 128
neurons. The activation function is ReLU function.
B. Convergence Analysis
To evaluate the convergences of different agents in MAD-
DPG, we train the models five times under the same set-
tings with different random seeds. We illustrate the rewards
of different agents at different training episodes in Fig. 8,
respectively. The shadow areas in the figures represent the
standard deviations of the rewards of the five training times at
the different episodes. We can observe from these figures that
the rewards of different agents all converge.
The converged rewards of Microgrid 1 and 2 are larger than
zero. This is because Microgrid 1 and 2 have larger capacities
for renewable energy generation than their own consumptions.
Therefore, they can sell their surplus energy on the hour-ahead
market and gain revenues. Their revenues are larger than their
cost, therefore, their converged rewards are larger than zero.
The rewards of Microgrid 3 and 4 also increase during the
training, because they can save more cost by improving the
trading policy on the hour-ahead market. By trading on the
hour-ahead market, they can save more cost compared with
buying energy from the wholesale market.
The results illustrated in Fig. 8 verify the feasibility of
adopting the multiagent approach for learning the optimal
control policy for each microgrid. The four microgrids in the
studied case are mixed cooperative-competitive. Microgrid 1
and 2 are competitors for energy selling, and Microgrid 3
and 4 are competitors for energy buying. Microgrid 1 and
2 also collaborate with Microgrid 3 and 4 for energy trading
for mutual benefit. The convergences of the agents verify that
the agents can find the equilibrium in the mixed cooperative-
competitive environment for maximizing their rewards.
C. Performance Analysis
We analyze each agent’s performances by illustrating the
characteristics of the system states and the control actions of
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(a) Microgrid 1 (b) Microgrid 2 (c) Microgrid 3 (d) Microgrid 4
Fig. 9. The distribution of the bid price of different microgrids on the hour-ahead market.
(a) Microgrid 1 (b) Microgrid 2 (c) Microgrid 3 (d) Microgrid 4
Fig. 10. The distribution of the trading quantity of different microgrids on the hour-ahead market.
(a) Microgrid 1 (b) Microgrid 2 (c) Microgrid 3 (d) Microgrid 4
Fig. 11. The distribution of the battery levels of different microgrids during different time slots.
Fig. 12. The distribution of clearing price on the hour-ahead market.
each microgrid. We collect the control actions and the system
states during each time slot over 1000 testing episodes. The
distributions of the system states and the control actions are es-
timated with Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) and Histogram
(Hist) to analyze the characteristics of each microgrid.
We illustrate the distribution of the bid price and the trading
quantity of different microgrids on the hour-ahead market in
Fig. 13. The distribution of overall trading quantity on the hour-ahead market.
Fig. 9 and 10, respectively. In our definition of the control
action of each agent, if the price of an agent during one time
step is larger than zero, the agent is a seller during the time
slot. If the price is less than zero, the agent is a buyer during
the time slot. In Fig. 9 and 10, we can observe that Microgrid
1 and 2 are mainly as the sellers on the hour-ahead market,
because they have more surplus energy, which incentives them
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Fig. 14. The comparisons of the cost, revenue and the overall reward for
Microgrid 1 under different methods.
Fig. 15. The comparisons of the cost, revenue and the overall reward for
Microgrid 2 under different methods.
to sell to obtain revenues. Microgrid 3 and 4 are mainly as
buyers on the hour-ahead market due to lower capacities of
energy generation. The distributions of bid price and trading
quantity are in line with the characteristics of each microgrid’s
energy consumption and generation capacity.
The distributions of the selling price of Microgrid 1 and 2
are sharp, while the buying price of Microgrid 3 and 4 are
flatter, because Microgrid 1 and 2 are more competitive on
energy selling, and the renewable energy may be wasted if
batteries have been fully charged and the generation exceeds
the consumption. On the contrary, Microgrid 3 and 4 may
change buying price based on their varying demands.
The distribution of the market clearing price on the hour-
ahead market is illustrated in Fig. 12. The market clearing
price mostly lies within the range (15, 20), which is much
lower than the wholesale market price. Therefore, Microgrid
3 and 4 have the incentives of buying from the hour-ahead
market to reduce cost. In some cases, there is no trade made
on the hour-ahead market because the selling price is too high
or the buying price is too low.
We illustrate the distribution of the overall trading quantity
during a time slot on the hour-ahead market in Fig. 13.
The microgrids prefer to submit the trading quantity at the
maximum allowed quantity, because Microgrid 3 and 4 can
always save cost by buying more from the hour-ahead market
if they can consume. On the contrary, Microgrid 1 and 2 can
get more revenues by selling more, if the trading quantity
does not exceed the surplus. Therefore, the trading quantity of
a microgrid has a large probability of being on the threshold
of the maximum allowed trading quantity.
Fig. 16. The comparisons of the cost, revenue and the overall reward for
Microgrid 3 under different methods.
Fig. 17. The comparisons of the cost, revenue and the overall reward for
Microgrid 4 under different methods.
We illustrate the distribution of the battery levels of different
microgrids in Fig. 11. The battery levels of Microgrid 3 and
4 are low during most of the time slots, because they have
low capacity of energy generations. For Microgrid 1 and 2,
their batteries may be fully charged, if they have too much
surplus energy and cannot sell on the energy market, which
incentives them to sell on the hour-ahead market. Therefore,
the battery capacity is more important for the microgrids with
larger capacity of renewable generation.
D. Performance Comparison
We compare the performances of our proposed method with
the following baseline methods.
1) Isolated: the microgrids operate in an isolated mode, in
which each microgrid can only supply the generated renewable
energy to itself or charge the surplus energy to its battery. A
microgrid can only buy energy on the wholesale market to
meet its demand when local generation is deficient.
2) DDPG: the microgrids can trade with each other, yet the
agent of each microgrid is trained independently with DDPG,
which is a single-agent reinforcement learning approach. The
agents will not share information with each other.
We illustrate the comparisons of the cost, revenue, and
the overall reward per time slot for Microgrid 1-4 in Fig.
14, 15, 16, 17, respectively. In the X-axises of these figures,
Wholesale represents the cost for buying from the wholesale
market, Buying represents the cost for buying on the hour-
ahead market, Selling represents the revenue for selling on the
hour-ahead market, Penalty represents the penalty for violating
the selling contract, and Overall represents the overall reward
of the sum of the costs and revenue.
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Fig. 18. The comparisons of the successful trading ratio and the average
trading quantity per trading under different methods.
As illustrated in Fig. 14-17, the four microgrids can obtain
a higher overall reward under our proposed method compared
with the baselines. The results show that the multiagent deep
reinforcement learning approach can effectively improve the
reward of each agent by collaboratively learning the policy for
each agent compared with the baselines.
As illustrated in Fig. 14 and 15, Microgrid 1 and 2 can
obtain revenues by energy selling on the hour-ahead market.
Thus, the overall rewards under our method and DDPG are
higher than Isolated. With Isolated, the cost, revenue, and the
overall reward are all near to zero, because Microgrid 1 and 2
have enough renewable energy generation to meet its demands,
but cannot gain revenues without energy trading.
With our method, Microgrid 1 and 2 can gain more revenue
compared with DDPG. As illustrated in Fig. 18, this is partly
due to that the successful trading ratio and the average trading
quantity per time slot with our proposed method are higher
than that of DDPG. Therefore, Microgrid 1 and 2 can obtain
more revenues on the hour-ahead market, and Microgrid 3 and
4 can save more cost via energy trading.
Fig. 16 and 17 verify that our proposed method can reduce
more cost for Microgrid 3 and 4 compared with the baseline
methods. This is because Microgrid 3 and 4 can successfully
buy more energy from the hour-ahead market compared with
DDPG, and the price on the hour-ahead market is much
lower than the wholesale market, thus it can save more cost
compared with DDPG. On the contrary, with the Isolated
method, all energy must be brought from the wholesale market
with a higher price, it will incur more cost.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a multiagent deep reinforcement
learning approach for learning the optimal policy for dis-
tributed energy trading and scheduling among the microgrids.
Each microgrid is model as an agent, which can cooperate and
compete with other agents on the hour-ahead energy market
for energy trading and make the local scheduling decision. We
model the problem as a Markov game which aim to maximize
the reward for each microgrid. We adopt MADDPG to design
the algorithm to learn the optimal policy for each agent. To
evaluate the performance, we conduct the experiments using
the real-world datasets. The experimental results show that
each agent can find the equilibrium in the mixed cooperative-
competitive environment and converge to the optimal policy.
Our method can reduce the cost and improve the overall reward
for each microgrid compared with the baseline methods.
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